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MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: THE LINGERING EFFECT OF THE
COMMON LAW SEPARATION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE
REMEDIES
In 1961 the Illinois General Assembly amended section I of the Civil
Practice Act to include mortgage foreclosures in the enumeration of special
proceedings regulated by separate statute.' As part of the separate procedure
for foreclosures, it reenacted without significant change the statutory authority
of a court of equity to render a personal judgment in a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding.2 That statute would seem to bring mortgage foreclosures in line
with actions brought under the Civil Practice Act wherein complete joinder of
legal and equitable claims is permitted.3 This, however, is not true. While
section 44 of the Civil Practice Act is a codification of the general rule of
equity favoring complete adjudication of all claims of a controversy in a single
action, section 56 of the Mortgage Foreclosure Act is the legislature's
response to the acceptance in Illinois of the case law rule that statutory
authority is a necessity before a court of equity can exercise personal
jurisdiction in a foreclosure. 4 The distinction, though subtle, paved the way for
a judicial interpretation which limited the beneficial effect of that statutory
authority by not extending personal jurisdiction under it to parties secondarily
liable on the note secured by the mortgage.' The liability of those parties must
be established in a subsequent proceeding. This note is intended to show that
neither the origin of the rule generating the statute nor the purpose of the
interpretation limiting it contained any significant rationale to counterbalance
the widely expressed policy disfavoring a multiplicity of suits.
THE ORIGIN OF THE RULE
A familiar rule of equity states that once a court of equity acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a controversy it retains jurisdiction to
render full equitable and legal relief.6 This general proposition is accepted in
Illinois.' Despite this concept a case law rule developed that, in the absence of
a statute or court rule, a court of equity was without power to render a
personal judgment for a deficiency during a foreclosure proceeding.
A deficiency results when the sale of the mortgaged property does not
supply sufficient funds to pay the debt it secures. A mortgage is given as
security for an obligation not in payment of it. Generally, the holder is entitled
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,§ 1 (1973).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 56 (1973),formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 17 (1961).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 44 (1973).
4. Cook v. Moulton, 64 Ill. App. 429 (1896).
5. Walsh v. Van Horn, 22 111. App. 170 (1887).
6. Armstrong v. Gilchrist, 2 Johns. Ch. 424 (1800); Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co.,
129 N.Y. 274, 29 N.E. 315 (1891).
7. Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N.E. 420 (1935).
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to payment of the full amount of the debt and accepting a mortgage does not
imply that the creditor is to look solely to the property for satisfaction., He
may proceed by foreclosure to force a sale of the property, or he may choose
to ignore the security and bring an action at law on the indebtedness.9 If the
mortgagee chooses the equity route and the mortgaged property is sold under
a foreclosure decree or pursuant to a power of sale, 10 he is recognized to have
a cause of action against the mortgagor for the deficiency.1 Under the case
law rule exempting legal remedies from foreclosure proceedings, the mortga-
gee was obliged to seek recovery of the balance due in a subsequent
proceeding at law.
The origin of that rule seems to be Dunkley v. Van Buren," a New York
case. It was cited for this proposition by the highest courts of Kentucky,
Alabama, and Mississippi." While Dunkley may have initiated this rule, it did
not perpetuate it. In response, many states passed statutes granting equity
courts the power to render a deficiency judgment against any person liable on
the debt who is properly before the court.14 Dunkley remained the authority
cited by courts, deciding questions involving these statutes, for the proposition
that such statutes were necessary."
In Dunkley, Chancellor Kent held that the in rem nature of a foreclosure
action was not intended to include an in personam judgment for a deficiency.
He stated that the plaintiff had a right to sue at law for the deficiency, if the
sale of the property was not sufficient to cover the debt. English cases were
cited as precedent for this proposition,1 6 but they were not on point. Those
cases recognized that the mortgagee had both a remedy at law on the debt and
8. Rogers v. Ward, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 387 (1864).
9. Separate actions at law and in equity can be pursued and two judgments obtained, but
the satisfaction of one releases the other. Barnes v. Upham, 93 Conn. 491, 107 A. 300 (1919);
Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912); Markus v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 373 Ill. 557, 27 N.E. 2d 463 (1940); Anderson v. Warren, 196 Okla. 251, 164 P. 2d
221 (1945).
10. Sales pursuant to a power of sale contained in a mortgage or a trust deed are no longer
permitted in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 23 (1973).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 56 (1973). Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U.S. 168 (1879); Voorhis
v. Crutcher, 98 Fla. 259, 123 So. 742 (1929); Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 193 N.W. 587
(1923).
12. 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (1818).
13. Hunt v. Lewin, 4 Stew. & P. 138 (Ala. 1833); Downing v. Palmateer, 17 Ky. (1 T. B.
Mon.) 64 (1824); Stark v. Mercer, 4 Miss. (3 How.) 377 (1839). Other cases announced the
same rule without reliance on any precedent. Noonan v. Braley, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 499 (1862);
Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73 (1863); Cook v. Moulton, 64 II1. App. 429 (1896);
Pool v. Young, 23 Ky. (2 T. B. Mon.) 588 (1828).
14. Presently, 31 states have specific legislation permitting deficiency judgments during
mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
15. Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347 (1881); Julian v. Pilcher, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 254 (1865);
Culver v. Judge of the Superior Court of Detroit, 57 Mich. 25, 23 N.W. 469 (1885); Weir v.
Field, 67 Miss. 292, 7 So. 355 (1890).
16. Aylet v. Hill, 21 Eng. Rep. 384 (1770); Took's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 476 (1774);
Dashwood v. Blythway, 21 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1729); Dashwood v. Bithazey, 25 Eng. Rep. 347
(1729).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in equity to foreclose, but under the then prevailing theory of foreclosure no
question of a deficiency was present if the mortgagee elected to seek his
remedy in equity."
Under English law at that time a mortgage was a conveyance of the fee
by the mortgagor to the mortgagee."8 The conveyance was conditioned in such
a manner that the payment of a specified sum at the proper time and place
restored title in the mortgagor. 9 Default in such payment caused the title of
the mortgagee to become absolute.2 0 It became the practice of mortgagors to
petition a court of equity to permit the mortgagor to pay the amount of the
indebtedness with interest and costs, notwithstanding that time for payment
had passed, and thereby redeem the property. 21 Courts of equity so favored
this method of preventing forfeitures that the right to redeem-called the
equity of redemption-became firmly fixed in the law.2 2 To counter this
practice, mortgagees sought the aid of a court of equity to fix the time within
which the mortgagor could redeem. 23 This was the origin of the foreclosure
suit. It was strictly in rem and, thus, was termed a strict foreclosure. 24 Its
object was not to recover on the indebtedness, but to fix and declare the
absolute right of the mortgagee in the premises. There was no sale ordered
and, thus, no deficiency to be enforced by way of a personal judgment.
Some courts totally rejected Dunkley, thereby dissolving the demarcation
line between law and equity, without the aid of the legislature, for the purpose
of preventing a multiplicity of suits.2 15 The Supreme Court of South Carolina,
in Anderson v. Pilgram,6 relied on an act of the state legislature that altered
the nature of a mortgage from a conveyance on condition to a lien2" to give
courts of equity the power to render deficiency judgments. This alteration
changed a foreclosure suit from a proceeding to confirm legal title by cutting
off the equity of redemption to an action for sale of the mortgaged premises
and application of the proceeds to the mortgaged debt. With the remedy now
being satisfaction of the debt, the court declared that the foreclosure
proceeding took on the character of an in personam as well as an in rem
action. 28 On that ground they justified not following Dunkley, without
17. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 332 (2 ed. 1970).
18. Id. § 5.
19. Id.
20. Chaplin, The Story of the Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9, 10 (1890).
21. Kinnoul v. Money, 26 Eng. Rep. 830 (1767); Jones v. Kennick, 2 Eng. Rep. 655
(1727); Wiechalse v. Short, 1 Eng. Rep. 1497 (1713); Rossarrick v. Barton, 22 Eng. Rep. 769
(1672).
22. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 6 (2 ed. 1970).
23. Id. § 10.
24. Id. § 311.
25. Nolan v. Woods, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea.) 615 (1883); Young v. Vail, 29 N.M. 324, 222
P. 912 (1924).
26. 30 S.C. 499, 9 S.E. 587 (1889).
27. The statute under which Anderson was decided made no mention of deficiency
judgments. It can be found in Morgan v. Bogan, 45 S.C. (I I Rich.) 686, 691 (1857).
28. 30 S.C. at 503, 9 S.E. at 588.
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hesitating to consider that the action in Dunkley also involved a judicial sale.2 9
The court found no reason for the debtor to be harrassed by two suits, one in
law and one in equity, when the same result could be reached by permitting a
court of equity to render an in personam judgment for the remainder of the
debt.30 Mortgages are now almost without exception treated as liens rather
than conveyances in the United States."'
The History of the Rule in Illinois
Illinois is a jurisdiction which considers a mortgage to be a lien rather
than a conveyance,3 2 but it has never accepted the South Carolina rationale
preferring to rely on express statutory authority. The Illinois statute empow-
ers a court of equity to enter a deficiency judgment against anyone personally
liable on the debt and amenable to process." While deciding that the Illinois
statute authorized a decree of personal liability only after the foreclosure sale,
the court in Cook v. Moulton34 made reference to the necessity of statutory
power to render such a judgment without citing any authority. Dunkley could
have been the origin of this rule in Illinois, since it had been cited earlier in
Vansant v. Allman" for the proposition that a mortgagee could pursue his
several remedies on the note and mortgage at the same time. Whatever the
origin of the rule, its existence set the stage for judicial construction of the
statute authorizing deficiency judgments. An important area of interpretation
became the status of persons who could be considered personally liable on the
mortgage under the statute.
One of the early controversies in interpreting the Illinois statute, and
similar ones in other states, concerned the liability for a deficiency of a
grantee who, as consideration for the conveyance, agreed with the mortgagor
to assume the mortgage payments. Without statutory authority to grant
deficiency decrees, 36 a New Jersey court in Klappworth v. Dressler"7 found
that a court of equity did not exceed its jurisdictional powers by holding a
grantee for the deficiency. The mortgagor's insolvency provided a subtle
distinction. The court's theory was that, since the insolvency of the mortgagor
left the mortgagee without a remedy for the recovery of the debt, equity
should provide relief by permitting him to recover, as the mortgagor could
have, from the grantee.3" Thus, the chancellor was able to enforce against the
29. 3 Johns. Ch. 330 at 331.
30. 30 S.C. at 502, 9 S.E. at 588.
31. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 1 (b) n 15 (1961).
32. Kling v. Ghilarducci, 3 111. 2d 454, 121 N.E. 2d 752 (1954).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 56 (1973).
34. 64 Il1. App. 429 (1896).
35. 23 Ill. 26 (1859).
36. The New Jersey courts did follow the rule of Dunkley that an equity court was
generally without power to render a deficiency judgment. Statutory authority to do so was granted
after Klappworth, but later repealed. See Stoddard v. Van Bussum, 57 N.J.Eq. 518, 194 A. 811
(1937).
37. 13 N.J.Eq. 62 (1860).
38. Id. at 65.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
grantee, what he had no power to enforce against the mortgagor under the
Dunkley rule.
The Illinois court, using its statutory authority, devised a broader and
more satisfactory rule. In Dean v. Walker, 19 the court declared the liability of
all grantees without any regard to the financial condition of the grantor. They
found the contract between the grantee and mortgagor under which the
grantee agreed to pay the debt was made to benefit the mortgagee.40 Under a
third party beneficiary theory the grantee had become personally liable to the
mortgagee for the debt. Thus, a deficiency judgment could be entered against
a grantee, if he was made a party to the foreclosure suit.1 The court
recognized that the grantee had by contract become a party to the original
mortgage transaction. This decision with respect to subsequent grantees,
however, was not expanded into a general rule that a court of equity could
decide the rights between all persons joined as parties in a foreclosure.
THE ILLINOIS EXCEPTION
Illinois courts developed an exception concerning persons who would not
be considered personally liable for the debt under the statute. This exception
declared that persons secondarily liable on the note secured by the mortgage
could not be subject to a deficiency judgment in the foreclosure proceeding.
Their liability would have to be established in a separate action at law. The
class of persons secondarily liable could include indorsers,' 2 accommodation
parties,4" or guarantors." Their liability is different from that of the mortgagor
or grantee, because they have agreed to pay the debt only if the person who
has undertaken the primary responsibility for it does not. This exception for
secondary parties evolved in cases concerning the liability of the mortgagee to
his assignee.
In Walsh v. Van Horn," the mortgagee, Walsh, had assigned the notes
and mortgage to plaintiff, Van Horn. The debt was not paid and Van Horn
39. 107 I1. 540 (1883).
40. Id. at 545.
41. Ingram v. Ingram, 172 Ill. 287, 50 N.E. 198 (1940).
42. An indorsement is a formal act which is necessary to pass title of a note to the
indorser's transferee. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-202 (1973). The indorser is a person who
makes the contract of indorsement. The contract of indorsement is a promise by the indorser that
he will pay the instrument if the maker or other person primarily liable does not. Thus, the
indorser has become secondarily liable on the note, and his liability is dependent upon the
performance of certain conditions, see note 49 irra.
43. An accommodation party is one who signs an instrument in any capacity for the
purpose of lending his credit to the obligation of the debtor. The accommodation party is liable iri
the capacity in which he signed either as an indorser, see note 42 supra, or as a co-maker. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-415(1), (2) (1973). The accommodation party who signs as a co-maker
may be considered primarily liable, because he can be sued by the creditor without demand being
made on the debtor. See Foreman Trust & Say. Bank v. Cohn, 267 Ill. App. 469, q5'd, 342 111.
280, 174 N.E. 419 (1932).
44. A guarantor is a person who agrees to pay the indebtedness of another if that person
does not. He is not an indorser and is not entitled to the conditions precedent to an indorser's
liability, see note 49 irlfra. Gridley v. Capen, 72 III. 11 (1874).
45. 22 Ill. App. 170 (1887).
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foreclosed. Service of process was made upon Walsh in an attempt to hold
him for the deficiency. The court held that persons considered personally
liable by the statute included only those parties before the court for the
purpose of the foreclosure, the mortgagor or his grantee, and not third persons
whose liability was that of an indorser or guarantor. 46 The court evidently
considered the agreement of secondary parties to be ancillary to the mortgage
transaction and decided that the statute had not extended jurisdiction to those
questions.
A subsequent appellate court decision cited Walsh with approval, but
also seems to be equally based on the insufficiency of the complaint. In
Christensen v. Niedert,'4 the court found the mortgagee, who at the insistence
of his assignee, had signed the reserve side of several bearer" notes secured
by a trust deed to be liable on them as an indorser, but stated that the
allegations of the complaint did not disclose whether the conditions precedent
to his liability as an indorser had been performed. 49 The court's citation of
Walsh implied that it agreed with the rule that a personal judgment could not
be entered in a foreclosure suit against a person secondarily liable on the debt.
But, the reasons stated for its decision might equally indicate that the
indorser's liability was not properly established at trial, and for that reason the
indorser could not be held liable.
The exception that Illinois grafted on its deficiency judgment statute was
not based on the substantive rights of a party involved in the original mortgage
transaction or subsequent assignments, but is merely a procedural aberration.
The secondary party is not absolved from liability but is merely granted the
privilege of a separate suit. The holder of the note will certainly not complain
of adjudication of all issues in a single suit. The primary party is not
prejudiced by the court's consideration of the additional questions of second-
ary liability, because his insolvency or refusal to pay ripened the liability of
the secondary party. Thus, there does not seem to be any valid considerations
to counterbalance the general policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.
THE VIEWPOINT IN OTHER STATES
The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the same exception as did Illinois
using a transaction test similar to the one used in Walsh v. Van Horn10 In
Hamill v. McCalla,5 the court held that indorsers of the mortgage notes were
46. Id. at 172.
47. 259 Ill. App. 96 (1930).
48. A bearer note may be negotiated by delivery of the note and no indorsement is
required. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-202(1) (1973).
49. The indorser's liability is conditional upon the holder's compliance with specific
requirements. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-414(1) (1973). The holder must present the
instrument to the debtor for payment at the proper time, id. § 3-503, and must give the indorser
notice of the debtor's dishonor, id. § 3-508.
50. 22 Ill. App. 170 (1887).
51. 228 Ala. 281, 153 So. 412 (1934).
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not proper parties to a foreclosure action. Despite a statute allowing for
deficiency decrees, the court said that a party subject to a deficiency decree
had to be one who was jointly liable on the debt, had some interest in the
property, or had a right which would affect the equity of redemption." A
party whose only remaining interest in the transaction was to guarantee
payment of the debt was not such a party."
An opposite conclusion was reached by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
which held in Halbach v. Trester" that a secondary party was sufficiently
involved in the transaction to be made a party to the foreclosure. There, a
-deficiency judgment in favor of the third holder of the mortgage note was
entered against the original mortgagee on his contract of indorsement. The
court acted under a statute which provided that the plaintiff could unite in a
foreclosure action every party who might be personally liable on the debt if
they were a party to the same contract which the mortgage was given to
secure. By its holding, the court inferred that the mortgage transaction was
not a singular event and anyone who pledged his credit became and remained
a party until the debt was discharged.
Wisconsin courts do, however, recognize the particular characteristics of
the indorser's contract. In Stellmacher v. Sampson," the court held that a
party who "guarantees collectibility" could not be subject to a deficiency
decree in a foreclosure action. One who guarantees collectibility is liable for
the debt only after the creditor has proceeded to judgment against the party
primarily liable.56 A deficiency decree against the primary party in the
foreclosure action fulfills this condition and allows the creditor to proceed
against the guarantor of collectibility in a subsequent suit."'
The Florida court took the boldest approach in Degge v. First National
Bank of Eustis.5" The court was faced with deciding whether a deficiency
judgment could be entered against a bank, who had assigned the mortgage and
indorsed the note, in light of a change in the statutory language which
52. Id. at285, 153 So. at416.
53. Id.
54. 102 Wis. 530, 78 N.W. 759 (1899).
55. 195 Wis. 635, 219 N.W. 343 (1928).
56. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-416(2).
57. New York is in accord with the general proposition that persons liable for a deficiency
should be parties to the same transaction, Frank v. Davis, 135 N.Y. 275, 31 N.E. 1100 (1892),
which would include guarantors, Klienke v. Samuels, 264 N.Y. 144, 190 N.E. 324 (1934), and
indorsers, Kerhonson Nat. Bank v. Granite Sunshine Hotel, 26 A.D. 2d 713, 271 N.Y.S. 376
(1966), but not guarantors of collectibility, Robert v. Kindansey, 111 A.D. 475, 97 N.Y.S. 913,
affd, 188 N.Y. 638, 81 N.E. 1174 (1906). The statute under which these decisions were made
was repealed, but the new statutory scheme which retains the power to render deficiency
judgments during foreclosures, N.Y. RPAPL § 1371 (McKinney Supp. 1974), and adds the
requirement of a recorded agreement to hold a grantee liable, N.Y. GEN. OL. § 5-705
(McKinney Supp. 1974), does not seem to alter the liability of secondary parties. A guarantor
was held liable under the new statute in State Bank of Albany v. AMAK Enterprises, 77 Misc. 2d
340, 353 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1974).
58. 145 Fla. 438, 199 So. 564 (1941).
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eliminated the phrase authorizing such judgments "against all persons liable
for the mortgage debt." Previous cases had held that due to this alteration
there no longer existed a statute or court rule which authorized a court of
equity to render a deficiency judgment against an indorser or guarantor.5 9 The
court said that it bordered on the ridiculous to say that a court of equity had
no power to do something without a rule which it could theretofore have
made, 0 and declared one based on the well-settled principle that once equity
took jurisdiction it could give full relief. The effect of the holding was to
declare the power of an equity court to be co-extensive with the rights of the
parties properly before it.
Excluding the adjudication of secondary liability from a foreclosure
proceeding, as Illinois does, seems to be, at most, lingering residue of the
technical rule excluding all legal remedies from foreclosures. Consequently, it
is not surprising a similar exception has not been adopted by a majority of the
jurisdictions which have considered the question.6" It is surprising that Illinois
should retain this vestige of a rule which the legislature had attempted to
eliminate.62 This retention is inconsistent with the complete merger of legal
and equitable jurisdiction under the Civil Practice Act.63 True, mortgage
foreclosures have a separate statutory procedure,'64 but that procedure, which
includes a short-form complaint with statutory allegations, seems to be aimed
at modernization and efficiency rather than incorporation of old and burden-
some concepts of equity.
THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE ILLINOIS EXCEPTION
The Illinois rule exempting parties secondarily liable from deficiency
judgments in foreclosures originated in suits involving the indorsement
contract of the original mortgagee. It can be argued that the holder has made a
contract with the mortgagee-indorser which is separate and distinct from his
remedy on the property securing the note, and the indorser should not be a
party to a proceeding in which he has no interest until after the sale of the
property results in a deficiency. This argument loses much of its validity when
one considers that the holder has separate remedies at law and equity and
could have proceeded against the indorser on the note immediately upon the
mortgagor's default. 6 Thus, the foreclosure action is not a mandatory
59. Prevatt v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 129 Fla. 464, 176 So. 494 (1937); Reves
v. Younghusband, 101 Fla. 165, 133 So. 618 (1931).
60. 145 Fla. at 441, 199 So. at 565.
61. In states deciding the question the exception for parties secondarily liable has been
affirmed in Alabama, see note 51 supra, and Maryland, Kusknick v. Lake Drive Bldg. & Loan
Assn., 153 Md. 638, 139 A. 446 (1927), and rejected in Wisconsin, see note 54 supra, Florida,
see note 58 supra, New York, see note 57 supra, Michigan, Michigan State Bank of Eaton Rapids
v. Trowbridge, 92 Mich. 217, 52 N.W. 632 (1892), and South Carolina, Welborn v. Cobb, 92
S.C. 384, 75 S.E. 691 (1912).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 56 (1973).
63. Id. ch. 110, § 44.
64. Id. ch. 95, § 23.
65. See note 9 supra.
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prerequisite to the indorser's liability. The general nature of the rule, however,
allows the exception to apply to secondary parties who have a close and
continuing relationship to the mortgage contract. The land trust beneficiary
and the guarantor of corporate indebtedness are two common examples to
which the exception has been applied.
The validity of land trusts has -been upheld in Illinois on numerous
occasions." The land trust is a device by which the trustee gets complete legal
and equitable title in real property, but the beneficiary, usually the previous
fee owner, retains under the trust agreement complete control of the trustee's
acts with respect to it.67 The trustee is often called upon to execute a
mortgage, and, because the trustee, usually a bank or trust company, desires
no personal liability, the trust deed executed as security for the mortgage
usually contains a clause exonerating the trustee from any liability for a
deificency by requiring the mortgagee to look only to the property for
satisfaction of the debt. These exculpatory clauses have been enforced by the
court. 6 The effect of such clauses can be a requirement by the mortgagee that
the beneficiary sign the note guaranteeing payment.69
This situation was before the court in Schnur v. Bernstein.70 There, a
trust deed was executed by the trustee, Forman Trust & Savings Bank, as
security on a note. The trust deed provided that there was to be no personal
liability enforceable against the promisor or anyone beneficially interested,
and that the mortgagee's sole remedy was foreclosure of the trust deed. The
defendants, beneficiaries of the land trust, signed the reserve side of the note
as guarantors and recited that they "waived protest."'" Liability on such a
guarantee has been held effective despite the apparent exoneration in the
66. See, e.g., Crow v. Crow, 348 Il. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932); Duncanson v. Lill, 322
I1. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Bank, 300 111. App. 329,
20 N.E. 2d 992 (1939).
67. See Robinson v. Chicago National Bank, 32 I1. App. 2d 55, 58, 176 N.E. 2d 659, 661
(1961).
68. Lowenstein v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 340 Ill. App. 160, 91 N.E. 2d 96 (1950).
69. Without agreeing to become a guarantor, the beneficiary of a land trust is not liable on
the mortgage note even though he expressly directed the trustee to undertake the mortgage.
Conkling v. McIntosh, 324 I1. App. 292, 58 N.E. 2d 304 (1944).
70. 309 I1. App. 90, 32 N.E. 2d 675 (1941); accord, City of Chicago v. Chatham Bank of
Chicago, 54 11. App. 2d 405, 203 N.E. 2d 788 (1964); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Marks,
304 Ill. App. 438, 26 N.E. 2d 731 (1940).
71. The effect of waiving protest under the commercial code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-
511 (5) (1973), is to waive the necessity of conditions precedent to the indorser's liability, see
note 49 supra. In Schnur the indorsers also recited a guarantee of payment. Presently, under the
commercial code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-416(1) (1973), the holder may look directly to
such a signer for payment without going first to the debtor. Thus, post-code, the defendants in
Schnur would seem to be primarily liable parties, but the question remains unsettled. In City of
Chicago v. Chatham Bank of Chicago, 54 111. App. 2d 405, 203 N.E. 2d 788 (1964), a post-code
case, the party being charged with the deficiency had indorsed with a recital that she guaranteed
payment. The court reiterated the rule that a party secondarily liable could not be subject to a
deficiency judgment during a foreclosure and cited all of the previous authorities. It did not,
however, expressly state that the guarantor there was a secondary party, but held that she was not
properly served and, thus, the court had no personal jurisdiction over her.
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language of the trust deed. 7 On appeal, however, the lower court's order
entering a deficiency judgment against the defendants was reversed, because
the nature of their guarantee made them only secondarily liable on the debt. 73
It is common practice to require the personal guarantee of the officers or
directors of a small corporation on a note executed by the corporation. This is
especially true, if it is a closely held corporation, 74 and those persons are its
substantial owners. In Mortgage Syndicate, Inc. v. Do and Go Equipment,
Inc., 5 the mortgagee joined as defendants the three officers of the defendant
corporation who had indorsed the mortgage note with the recital "without
recourse." While the effect of the "without recourse" indorsement would
probably have been to release the officers of liability, 6 that consideration was
never reached. The court said that the law had not been changed to allow the
surety of an underlying note secured by real property to be called in to make
up a deficiency resulting from a foreclosure sale, although this seemed to be
permitted by the form of the statutory complaint.
7
The two illustrations presented have four important aspects in common.
As guarantors or indorsers the exempt defendants had both made a contract
of secondary liability promising to pay if the primary party did not. Both were
original and continuing parties to the mortgage obligation. Both were the real
parties that benefited from the execution of the mortgage. Finally, by the
manner in which both parties signed, their liability became effective upon the
non-payment of the debt by the primary party without any conditions
precedent. 7 The beneficiaries of the land trust had waived their rights to
conditions precedent by signing with a waiver of protest.' 9 The corporate
officers had complete control and knowledge of the corporation's non-
payment and would not have been prejudiced by lack of notice thereof.'0
Combining these factors points out the abusrdity of the requirement that the
liability of these parties had to be tried in a separate suit when the question
was so clearly before the court at the time of the foreclosure. These examples
are not exceptional circumstances, but are common transactions in which the
party who was secondarily liable was clearly the proper, and only, party who
had liability for the deficiency.
72. Conerty v. Richstag, 379 III. 360, 41 N.E. 2d (1942).
73. 309 Il. App. at 99, 32 N.E. 2d at 679.
74. A close corporation is one in which the voting shares are held by a closely-knit group of
stockholders. Generally, the same people are the shareholders, directors, and officers. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESs ENTERPRISES 506-08 (2 ed.
1970). The distinctive nature of the close corporation has been recognized in Illinois. Galler v.
Galler, 32 I11. 2d 16, 203 N.E. 2d 577 (1964).
75. 7 Ill. App. 3d 106, 286 N.E. 2d 520 (1972).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-414(l) (1973).
77. 7 Iii. App. 3d at 108, 286 N.E. 2d at 522. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 23 (1973)
provides a short form complaint which incorporates statutory allegations. One of those allegations
is a prayer for a deficiency judgment against anyone personally liable on the indebtedness.
78. 7 Ill. App. 3d at 108, 286 N.E. 2d at 522.
79. See note 49 supra.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-511(5) (1973).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Illinois Supreme Court has never spoken directly on the liability of
secondary parties. In Skolnik v. Petella," an appellate court said that the
statute conferring jurisdiction to grant deficiency judgments in mortgage
foreclosures' 2 was clearly intended to prevent a multiplicity of suits by
facilitating the determination of all possible questions between the same
parties. The Illinois Supreme Court, in affirming that decision, 3 said that a
court of equity, having jurisdiction over the foreclosure and personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties, had the statutory authority to render a personal
judgment to avoid piecemeal litigation.' 4 The exception with regard to
secondary parties is inconsistent with the tenor of those explanations of the
statutory policy. No court which has invoked the exception has offered any
reason for it except that the statutory authority does not expressly include
secondary parties.
CONCLUSION
When Chancellor Kent announced in Dunkley v. Van Buren"5 that equity
had no power except by statute to render a deficiency judgment, he relied on
English cases which were decided under a theory of foreclosure which did not
contemplate a sale of the property much less a deficiency. This rule was later
discredited by the highest court in the state of its origin. In Frank v. Davis,"1
the New York Court of Appeals pointed out that such a rule contravened the
policy of allowing equity to administer full legal and equitable relief and said,
with reference to Dunkley, that they could perceive "no reason" why
mortgage foreclosures had been excluded from this convenient and beneficent
policy.'
The Illinois courts not only accepted the rule of Dunkley,they resisted
the legislature's attempt to abolish it by carving an exception into the statute
for secondary parties. These courts did not reject the adjudication of
secondary liability on the ground of prejudice to any party. Their only concern
was that it was not expressly authorized by statute.
There are probably many reasons why this exception has not vanished
from Illinois law." Possibly, continually rising property values may preclude
most deficiences, or the cost of the subsequent suit might be less expensive
than an appeal on the issue. Whatever the reasons, this exception is
inconsistent with the Mortgage Foreclosure Act 9 which was designed to
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-511 (2) (b) (1973).
82. 304 Il1. App. 331, 26 N.E. 2d 646 (1940).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 56 (1973).
84. Skolnik v. Petella, 376 Ill. 500, 34 N.E. 2d 825 (1941).
85. Id. at 507, 34 N.E. 2d at 828.
86. 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (1818).
87. 135 N.Y. 275, 31 N.E. 1100 (1892).
88. Id. at 278, 31 N.E. atll01.
89. In First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Maywood v. Shaffer, 71CH308, Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, the trial court found that a prayer for relief against the guarantors preserved the right to
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shorten and simplify foreclosure proceedings.9 0 It is merely an element of the
expense and delay which troubles the area of mortgage foreclosures." While
the courts are not likely to change their position, their desire for statutory
authority could be satisfied if the state legislature would act to abolish this
unfavorable exception.
TIMOTHY F. KOCIAN
amend the complaint adding a count at law after the amount of the deficiency was determined in
the foreclosure. Recognizing the continuing validity of the exception, the court then transferred
the case to the law division for disposition. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 95, § 23 (1973).
90. Bernard, Legal Aspects of 1961 Mortgage Redemption Law Legislation in Illinois, 43
CHOO. BAR REC. 229 (1962).
91. Bridewell, Illinois Foreclosures Still Take Too Long and Cost Too Much, 45 CHGO.
BAR REC. 282 (1964).
